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FOREWORD
Both the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula
harbor real dangers for the Northeast Asian region.
The clash between an increasingly divergent nationalist identity in China and in Taiwan represents a new
challenge for U.S. policy in the region. Similarly, the
rise of pan-Korean nationalism in South Korea, and an
unpredictable North Korean regime that has succeeded in driving a wedge between Seoul and Washington,
has created another highly combustible zone of potential conflict.
This monograph, by Dr. Sheila Miyoshi Jager, explores how the United States might respond to the
emerging new nationalism in the region in order to
promote stability and peace. Offering a constructivist
approach which highlights the central role that memory, history, and identity play in international relations,
the monograph has wide-ranging implications for U.S.
foreign policy.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The main source of regional instability and potential conflict in Northeast Asia consists of those factors
to which most international relations theorists have
paid the least attention, namely, issues of memory,
identity, and nationalism. The potential for violent
military clashes in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean
peninsula largely involve disputes over history and
territory, linked as they are to the unresolved legacies
of the Cold War: a divided Korean peninsula and a
divided China. The “history disputes” that surround
these divisions continue to be a source of instability for
the region. The clash between an increasingly divergent
national identity in China and in Taiwan represents a
new challenge for U.S. policy on China. Moreover, it
is reshaping the security environment in the Taiwan
Strait in potentially destabilizing ways.
Similarly, the rise of pan-Korean nationalism in
South Korea is problematic. Motivated by the desire of
South Korea’s younger generation to seek reconciliation rather than confrontation with North Korea, it has
led to severe strains in U.S.-South Korean relations as
both Washington and Seoul attempt to resolve the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis. Linked to the rise
of new and competing nationalisms in the region is
China’s and South Korea’s suspicion of Japan and the
rise of neonationalism in that country. U.S. mishandling of these regional tensions involving questions of
identity and interpretations of history could plunge
the entire region inadvertently into war and conflict.
This monograph reflects on how the United States
might respond to the emerging nationalisms in the region in order to promote stability and peace. Breaking



with both realist and liberal analysis, the monograph
offers a constructivist approach which highlights the
central role that memory, history, and identity play in
the international relations of the area, with wide-ranging implications for U.S. foreign policy.
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THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY:
HISTORY, NATIONALISM AND THE PROSPECT
FOR PEACE IN POST-COLD WAR EAST ASIA
In an interview with Asian journalists on November
8, 2005, President George W. Bush urged Asian nationals to put their past behind them “in order to overcome
the tensions standing in the way of an optimistic future.”1 He went on to say that “it is possible to forget
the past . . . it’s difficult, but it is possible.” In a related
speech about the role of history in contemporary U.S.South Korean relations, Senator Hillary Rodham
Clinton chided South Korea for what she claimed was
a fog of “historical amnesia” that was clouding South
Korea’s relationship with Washington.2 Warning that
the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance was at a
critical juncture, she reminded South Koreans of the
U.S. role in bringing about their country’s remarkable
economic resurgence after the Korean War.
President Bush was referring to the recent antiJapanese protests in China and South Korea, while
Senator Clinton was speaking of rising anti-American
sentiments in South Korea and strains in the U.S.ROK alliance over the North Korean nuclear issue. In
each case, America’s policymakers are beginning to
recognize the vital role of national memory in shaping
contemporary events, although how memory is linked
to the emergence of a new post-Cold War order in East
Asia is less understood.
While current debates on the future of international
relations in Northeast Asia have focused mostly on
security dilemma, balance of power, and neoliberal
cooperation theory in predicting the prospects for
either regional tension or prolonged peace in the



region, the vital role of memory, national identity, and
history in influencing Northeast Asia’s new strategic
alignments and emerging international tensions has
not yet been seriously addressed by international
relations scholars or the American policy community.3
Academic analyses of the causes of conflict have looked
to structural theories of international relations (balance
of power, opportunities for trade, and so on) and largely
discounted ideas and culture as causal variables. But
as Thomas Berger has pointed out, “This gap in the
academic analyses has practical consequences. In the
absence of theoretically grounded models that can
explain which particular factors are important and
why, it is impossible to articulate a foreign policy
that addresses them as issues.”4 At best, the history
disputes that currently plague relations between
China, South Korea, and Japan have been treated as
mere epiphenomena, that is, as being reflective of
other, underlying forces of the self-interested state.
Perhaps the most common manifestation of this
debate, extending to the future of the Northeast Asian
region in general, is the disagreement between socalled liberal optimists and realist pessimists.5 By and
large, liberals take the view that the future of Northeast
Asian relations will be basically stable and peaceful,
pointing to the leavening effects of the economic
interdependence of the region, while realist pessimists
expect confrontation and conflict due to the new power
dynamic of a rising China. The implicit assumption
underlying both these views about the current state
of Northeast Asian relations, however, is that all units
in global politics have the same a priori interests to
further their material power, whether economic or
military. As mere symbolic manifestations of these
material interests, the emotional debates surrounding



the history of World War II and Japanese colonialism
are treated as mere shibboleths of competing elites who
seize on popular ideas to propagate and legitimize their
own self-interests; the ideas themselves do not play a
causal role in formulating policy. For realists, the recent
showdown between Beijing and Tokyo over history
is merely a symbolic manifestation of the new and
emerging great power struggles between a rising China
and a declining Japan, while for liberals, the history
problem that currently plagues relations in Northeast
Asia has been largely treated as an impediment that
eventually will be resolved by the forces of economic
cooperation and eventual regional integration.6
But as David Shambaugh has pointed out, the tendency to construct procrustean theories and the drive
to establish the superiority of one school of thought
over another have led to an approach that hinders
efforts to understand the complexities of real world
politics: “Unfortunately, there is no single conceptual
metamodel sufficient to describe the evolving Asian
system; one size does not fit all.”7 Moreover, if we
concede that the history problem in contemporary
Northeast Asian international relations is linked closely
not only to questions of power and cooperation, but
also to new notions of national identity and legitimacy,
and that perceptions of the past are connected
intimately with the meaning and cohesion that social
groups confer upon themselves, then the way in which
history currently is being debated in China, Japan,
Taiwan, and South Korea has direct consequences
for future political action and international relations.
Questions of national identity and legitimacy cannot
be understood deductively or theoretically, and to the
extent that Asia’s modern history of war has left an
indelible imprint on these societies’ views of the world



and of each other, the current history disputes will
continue to play a significant role in shaping the future
relations of states in Northeast Asia.
To a large extent, these disputed histories are
products of the unfinished legacy of the Cold War era.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to sustained
efforts to rediscover and rewrite the past which, in East
Asia, has included both the history of the Second SinoJapanese War (1937-45), the Chinese Civil War (194549), and the Korean War (1950-53). Unlike in Europe,
however, the Cold War has not ended in Asia. Rising
nationalism in China is a symptom of a nation in need
of a new identity in the wake of global communism’s
collapse, and what brings the history problem
(particularly, the history of the Second Sino-Japanese
War) to the fore diplomatically is precisely the search
for new sources of Chinese “post-communist” identity.
The rise of neonationalism in Japan is the result of
new domestic pressures by “normal state” advocates
to return to a pre-1945 world of statehood defined in
terms of the right of belligerency.8 Similarly, in South
Korea, a new generation of leaders is seeking to heal
the wounds of national division inflicted by the Korean
War by reconciliation, rather than confrontation, with
North Korea.
This search for a “post-communist” identity in
China, a “post-1945 identity” in Japan, or a “postdivision identity” in South Korea, however, is not
solely the prerogative of government elites who seek
to maintain their power. The use by elites of growing
popular nationalism as a powerful propaganda tool
to prop up state interests blinds us to the critical role
that people and passions play in politics. For example,
popular Chinese reactions to former Japanese Prime
Minister Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which



honors Japan’s war dead (including 14 World War IIera Class A war criminals), cannot be explained away
by the machinations of Chinese state-party interests
with complete power and control over the nationalist
discourse. Similarly, the nationalist rhetoric emerging
in contemporary South Korea, which seeks to include
its old Cold War enemy North Korea in a new story
of pan-Korean unity and identity, cannot be explained
away by the persuasive skills of South Korea’s new
leftist government elites. These phenomena suggest
the need for an explanation that recognizes the intrinsic
power of the nationalist ideas themselves and how the
substantive content of these ideas—about people’s
perceptions of their past and their future—really matter
for policy.
A serious effort to study the impact of national
identity on contemporary East Asian international
relations also opens up the possibility of exploring
the category of ideas and notions of identity as
evolving entities amenable to change. Far from a static
identity as embedded in an unchanging symbology
of a strategic culture or as reflective of a particular
East Asian historical pattern, national identities are
mutable, with significant world events impacting and
radically changing peoples’ national self-conceptions
and identities.9 The changing balance of power in East
Asia following the collapse of the Cold War geopolitical
world order has created conditions for changes in the
way in which the wartime past is being evaluated, and
in forces shaping these countries’ new nationalist selfconceptions.
As long “forgotten” war crimes are suddenly
brought out into the open for public inspection (like
the Korean comfort women issue in South Korea and
the 1937 Nanjing Massacre in China), other war crimes



are being reburied in the name of reestablishing the
bonds of community torn apart by the Cold War (a
case in point being the two Koreas). These exhumations
and reburials of the past play an important part in
the story of Northeast Asia’s post-Cold War political
transformations. Challenges to U.S. policy in Northeast
Asia that are linked to the current history disputes
in the region include contested borders, shifting
configurations of military power and diplomatic
perceptions, and possible redefinitions of national
security objectives among the East Asian countries.
The main sources of regional instability and
potential conflict in Northeast Asia are thus those
which, ironically, most international relations theorists
have paid the least attention to, primarily because
they are the kinds of variables that typically are
downplayed in contemporary international relations
theory, namely, issues of memory, identity, and
nationalism. As Thomas Berger observes, “The chief
source of instability in the region today lies in the
peculiar construction of national identity and interest
on the part of the chief actors in the region.”10 Relying
on insights from the so-called constructivist approach
to international relations, this monograph aims to
examine the current history disputes in China, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Japan in the context of post-Cold
War Asian politics, including the consequences of these
recent developments for U.S. policy in Northeast Asia. 11
There are two areas of particular concern in this connection: the fundamentally irreconcilable nationalist
movements in China and Taiwan, and the unresolved
issue of national unification on the Korean peninsula.
The potential for violent military clashes in the Taiwan
Strait and the Korean peninsula, which could plunge
the entire region into chaos, largely involves disputes



over history and territory linked to the unresolved
legacies of the Cold War.12
The monograph is divided into two interrelated
sections. The first section begins with a discussion
of the rise of nationalisms in China and Taiwan, and
how each is linked, on the one hand, to China’s “new”
memories of World War II (including the brutal role
that Japan played in that conflict), and, on the other,
to Taiwan’s “new” memories of the Chinese Civil War
(1945-49) and Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party,
or GMD) oppression. Accompanying the rise of Chinese
nationalism that is linked to the memory of China’s
historical victimization by Japan and the West has been
the simultaneous emergence of Taiwanese nationalism
as Taiwan’s leaders attempt to balance their search
for an autonomous political identity with the external
constraints imposed on that identity. The clash between
increasingly divergent national identities in China and
Taiwan represents a new challenge for U.S. policy on
China and is reshaping the security environment in the
Taiwan Strait in potentially destabilizing ways.
The second section explores competing national
memories and interests as they concern the division of
the Korean peninsula, and regional efforts to resolve
the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis. Central to
this issue is the rise of pan-Korean nationalism in South
Korea, and how new memories of the Korean War, and
of North Korea’s role in this brutal conflict, have led to
severe strains in Seoul’s relationship with Washington
as South Koreans seek reconciliation, not confrontation,
with Pyongyang. In order to preserve the U.S.-South
Korean alliance and find a resolution to the ongoing
North Korean nuclear crisis, the United States will need
to rethink its relationship with Pyongyang, including
ways to finally end the Korean War. Recent new



developments toward these goals are encouraging. On
February 13, 2007, a historic deal was struck in Beijing,
commencing the process of the denuclearization of
the Korean peninsula.13 The monograph concludes
with some reflections on how the United States might
respond to the changing geopolitical dynamics and
emerging new nationalisms in Northeast Asia, and on
what they mean for U.S. future policy in the region.
Overcoming a “Century of Humiliation”:
The Taiwan Problem.
Efforts to rewrite the past often occur during periods
of momentous change.14 This is particularly true of
China, where the memory and meaning of World
War II have undergone considerable reevaluations in
recent years and have played a central role in the rise
of popular nationalism in that country.
The role of historical memory in the configuration
of a new Chinese post-Cold War identity becomes
clear when one considers that the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) has taken little notice of the War of
Resistance to Japan (Kang-ri zhanzheng), as the Second
Sino-Japanese war (1937-45) war is known in China.
Although stylized versions of the conflict were found in
sources such as Cultural Revolution-era model operas,
for the most part, Mao downplayed the memory of the
war—and Chinese victimization—in order to focus
on more positive aspects of China’s past that would
serve as a model for building its communist future.15
As Rana Mitter has remarked, “In one sense, China’s
new awareness of its anti-Japanese conflict is part of
a process by which its attitude toward its history is
becoming more normal. For all other major powers
involved in World War II, victorious or defeated,



engagement with their war experience was crucial for
creating postwar identity.”16
But to a large extent this engagement with the war
did not happen in China. This was in large part due
to the way in which China moved from the World
War to the Cold War. By 1946, the Nationalists and
the Communists were at war, and the eventual victory
of the Communists in 1949 meant that a balanced
treatment of the earlier conflict was impossible. The
fact that Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists had played a
significant role in defeating the Japanese could not be
discussed easily after the Communist victory in 1949.
Moreover, Mao’s policies often permitted the Japanese
to destroy Nationalist forces and thus strengthen the
Communists. While Japanese brutality in the conflict
was not entirely forgotten, Chinese historical discussion of the war by and large regarded the Nationalists
as a greater threat than the Japanese. Indeed, according
to his personal physician, Mao even credited Japan
with the Communist victory in the civil war.17 When
Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka came to China in 1972
and tried to apologize for his country’s 1937 invasion
of China, Mao assured him that it was the “help” of
the Japanese invasion that made the Communist
victory possible.18 The signing of the Anhou-Tanaka
Communiqué of 1972, especially with the signing of
the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, has given
credibility to the bitter accusation, long hurled from
Taiwan, that Communist participation in the War of
Resistance to Japan had been, at best, half-hearted and
calculating.19
From the late 1980s onwards, however, China’s
portrayal of the war changed. The immediate context
of the shift was the Chinese response to the issue of a
Japanese textbook revision when it appeared in 1982.20



The event, however, that actually triggered Chinese
protests was Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit to the
Yasukuni Shrine in 1985, marking the 40th anniversary
of Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945. By linking
the visit with the revival of Japanese militarism and
recollecting the horrors of World War II, Chinese
leaders were provided an occasion to stir up nationalist
sentiments, thereby helping to unite the country in
the common goal of economic development that had
been initiated by Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping. The
decline of ideology that accompanied China’s postMao reforms exposed the loss of faith in the communist
system, and the search for some unifying system of
belief intensified during this period. By 1985, there were
already troubling signs that the post-Mao economic
reforms were running into trouble, and whipping
up nationalist sentiments provided an expedient for
reinvigorating the struggle for development.21
It was also during the 1980s that officially-endorsed
versions of the new history of World War II began
to appear in China’s news and information media,
including films, books, and, perhaps most concretely,
three massive museums that were built in Nanjing,
Beijing, and Shenyang. These sites were chosen for their
commemorative value in recalling to mind three major
incidents during the war: the 1937 Nanjing massacre,
the 1937 Marco Polo bridge incident, and the Japanese
invasion of Manchuria in 1931. In addition, the desire for
reunification with Taiwan encouraged a more positive
attitude toward the former Nationalist government.22
As Arif Dirlik notes, “Victory celebrations throughout
the summer of 1985 recalled Chinese unity displayed
during the war, including cooperation between the
Communist Party and the GMD, which made victory
possible.”23
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This revisionist historiography of World War II
also became important to the Chinese contemporary
self-image and new perceptions of national identity
following Deng’s post-Mao economic reforms. Not only
did the new accounts of the war begin to emphasize
both Communist and GMD cooperation in fighting
the Japanese, which helped foster the myth of national
unity among all Chinese; they also asserted China’s
new image as an assertive and confident power, now
willing and able to stand up to its former foe, Japan.
History became, again in the words of Arif Dirlik, “a
means of providing symmetry to an asymmetrical
relationship.”24 Throughout the 1980s, efforts to
rewrite the history of World War II thus became bound
with transformations of China’s image of itself and of
others.
By the 1990s, China’s nationalistic discourse took
on an entirely new turn, especially with regard to its
relationship to the West. During the 1980s, China’s
intellectuals, by and large, were very pro-Western,
even promoting Western democratic values against
the Chinese state.25
By the Cold War’s end, however, a great majority
of these same pro-western Chinese intellectuals now
submitted to the official party line. As many observers
of China have noted, the rise of China’s assertive
nationalism in the 1990s displayed a new anti-Western
bias which distinguished it from the pro-Western and
democratic views of Chinese intellectuals of the previous decade.26 At the socio-economic level, the reemergence of this assertive nationalism coincided with the
end of the Cold War and the beginning of China’s rapid
economic growth in the past decade. While the West
won the Cold War, many Chinese intellectuals began
to express concurrence with the official view that the
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post-Cold War transformation in Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union was not as positive as expected.
Disillusionment with the concomitant reforms led
many Chinese intellectuals who initially had supported
the 1989 Tiananmen uprising to conclude that, if China
were to initiate similar dramatic reforms promoted
by the West, the nation could well share a fate similar
to that of Russia and Eastern Europe. Moreover, the
tragedy of Tiananmen and the sustained criticism that
China was subjected to by the Western press were
interpreted as yet another form of Western “bullying,”
which conjured patriotic themes linked to China’s
past humiliation by foreigners. With the government
exploiting these themes, “the fanfare of patriotism
remained a largely orchestrated show until it began to
be echoed in academic circles in the mid-1990s with the
emergence of the so-called ‘China Can Say No literature’
that became accepted as mass-consumption goods
rather than academic works.” 27
Amid the anti-Western backlash resulting from the
West’s post-Tiananmen sanctions against China, the
regime was thus able to present itself as the defender of
China’s pride. It was also able to deflect Western criticism of China’s lack of human rights in precisely the
same terms. Associating these criticisms with the
aggressive, humiliating, and degrading historical
experiences of China’s past relationship with an
imperialist West, both official and populist nationalism
portrayed this criticism of China’s human rights record
as an affront not only to the dignity of the Chinese
nation, but to the personal dignity of all Chinese people.
As Edward Friedman has pointed out, “Recent events
have fostered a feeling among many educated Chinese
that promoting democracy is virtually synonymous
with treason, with splintering China, and with blocking
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its rise and return to greatness. The favored metaphor
for economic growth—that of stretching one’s wings
and flying up—is part of the idiom of national selfrespect; it is not the people who fly aloft, but the
Chinese nation.”28
What is remarkable, however, is that most of the
proponents of this nationalism were either trained
in the West or had been visiting scholars in Western
academic institutions.29 These western-educated
Chinese nationalists now play a pivotal role in
the contest to define freedom, citizen’s rights, and
democracy in parochial terms, that is, by emphasizing
Chinese values against Western values. Based on an
anti-imperialist impulse, this assertive nationalism is
thus “characterized by its vehement protest against neoimperialism and the containment of China by the West,
especially by the United States.”30 Memories of past
suffering and humiliation inflicted by the Japanese and
the West that have become a central part of the rhetoric
of China’s new populist nationalism therefore must be
understood in relation to China’s recent emergence as
a global power: its ability to finally “stand up” to the
West (a claim that also was made by Mao in 1949).31
Nevertheless, there are limits to how far the regime
will go in the name of nationalist pride. While the
regime has permitted, and often encouraged, populist
nationalists to take their militant views to the streets,
they are careful to call a halt to it when the threat to
China’s long-term economic interests are at stake.
After anti-Japanese protests continued unabated for 3
consecutive days in cities across China in April 2005,
Beijing censors, sensing that they had gotten out of
hand, imposed the blackout in order to contain further
damage to already strained Sino-Japanese relations.
These protests were the largest China had seen since
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1999, when angry crowds pelted the U.S. Embassy
following the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese
Embassy in Belgrade. At that time, then vice president
Hu Jintao, perceiving a threat to Sino-American
relations, went on national television to stop them.
The Chinese state is thus faced with two seemingly
contradictory goals: on the one hand, to integrate China
into global capitalist modernity, and on the other to
show China’s continuing hostility to any forms of neoimperialism that might remind of past weakness and
national fragmentation.32
For its part, Japan has abetted China’s anti-Japanese
nationalism. Despite protests from both China and
South Korea, former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi continued to visit the Yasukuni Shrine in
Tokyo throughout his tenure in office. It was under
Koizumi that observers of Japan first began to witness
the emergence of a newer and more strident form of
nationalism that made it permissible to recall the war
in increasingly positive terms.33 Concurrent with this
narrative of the war, however, has been a growing
vocal and aggressive call in some circles for revisions of
history textbooks that deny the 1937 Nanjing massacre
and the forced prostitution of Asian women.34 For
these neonationalists and “normal state” advocates, the
real issue surrounding Japan’s history problem is not
about repentance (many Japanese people believe that
they already have apologized sufficiently for their war
crimes), but about confronting the post-1945 Japanese
order which has left Japan, as Hisashi Owada put it,
“bereft of a healthy nationalism.”35 Decrying the socalled “masochistic historiography” promoted by the
pacific education of Japan’s postwar educators, these
nationalists have also questioned the wisdom of the
self-imposed constitutional restrictions on the military
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that have denied Japan a “normal” statehood. Japan’s
new security concerns in Asia, first brought to the fore
by North Korea’s 1998 Taepodong missile launching and
its 2006 nuclear test, have led more and more Japanese
to question the continuing validity of Article 9. Recent
polls, including one conducted by the progressive
Asashi Shimbun newspaper, show a clear majority of
Japanese people and parliamentarians are now in favor
of constitution revision.36 For Japan’s neonationalists
and “normal” state advocates, the Yasukuni Shrine
therefore has increasingly come to stand as a “symbol
of Japan as a future warrior rather than . . . of a defeated
nation clinging desperately to its martial past.”37
Thus, whereas China’s leaders interpreted
Koizumi’s continued visits to Yasukuni Shrine as a
lack of remorse over the past and as ongoing affronts
to Chinese dignity and self-respect, Japan’s new
nationalists have supported these visits for precisely
the same reason: in order to shore up their nation’s
own diminished sense of national dignity associated
with Japan’s defeat and subsequent occupation.
But China’s anti-Japanese nationalism also serves
another purpose. Today, the threat of internal ethnic
nationalism is the greatest source of anxiety in Beijing.
The revival of the memory of Japanese war atrocities
in China thus is aimed to create a common history of
national suffering that serves to bind China’s diverse
ethnic population together by creating an undivided
patriotism and loyalty to the Chinese state. While
China’s history of national humiliation plays a central
role in this narrative of shared collective suffering,
China’s rise as an economic powerhouse is also offered
up as a narrative of shared collective redemption.
The restoration of national pride lost during its
century of humiliation hinges, ironically, upon China’s
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dealings with Japan and the West. The contradictions
between a populist nationalism that vilifies Japan (and
the West) historically, and a pragmatic nationalism
that requires China to engage with Japan economically,
thus turn on the notion of national redemption, that is,
on the Chinese state’s pursuit of great power status as
antidote to China’s historical experience of weakness
and national fragmentation. War memory has been
central to that realignment and the attempts to square
the circle.
This search for an enduring national history that
could serve to bind China’s diverse populations in
identifying with a strong Chinese state also explains
why Beijing has encouraged a more positive attitude
toward the former Nationalist government (including
Nationalist leaders like Chiang Kai-shek) and their
contributions to the anti-Japanese war effort. For
their utility in creating a common history of shared
victimization that could serve to bind Taiwan with the
mainland, Nationalist contributions to China’s antiJapanese struggle, once written out of the CCP history
of the war, are currently being written back in.38
Moreover, the goal of reunification with Taiwan plays
a central part in China’s history of anti-imperialist
national struggle. This narrative traces anti-Chinese
policies back to Japan’s 1870s incursion into Taiwan
and Japan’s take-over of the island after its victory in
the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Reunification with
Taiwan is thus an intrinsic part of the Party’s narrative
of national redemption and is linked to China’s triumph
over its historical victimization, representing the end
at last of the age of national humiliation.
A problem, of course, is that native Taiwanese do not
share China’s historical antipathy toward Japan. Nor
do they identify with China’s history of anti-imperialist
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struggle. Native Taiwanese did not share in China’s
formative national experiences, including the May 4th
Movement, the war of the Northern Expedition, or the
Second Sino-Japanese war. When Japan took the island
in 1895 as a prize for its victory over China, Tokyo
ruled Taiwan as a colony within the Japanese Empire
for nearly half a century. This was a deeply formative
experience which divided the fate of the island from
the mainland. Whereas the Japanese colonization
produced a relatively peaceful and orderly system of
rule over the Taiwanese, Japanese imperialism, when
launched against China, was a ruthlessly destructive
and devastating force that led to the mass killings of
millions of people.39 Although the Taiwanese suffered
acute hardships at the end of the war, they remain
deeply ambivalent over this experience since many
Taiwanese soldiers who volunteered and died in the
war were regarded less as victims of Japan than as
honorable and praiseworthy Japanese subjects.
The end of the Pacific war returned Taiwan by Allied
agreement to China. However, the GMD occupation
after Japan’s surrender proved to be a far more
traumatic experience than Japan’s 50–year occupation
of the island. It was not so much the Sino-Japanese war
of 1937-45 that shapes memory in Taiwan, but rather
the legacy of the Chinese Civil War and the ruthless
suppression of the native Taiwanese population by
the GMD that led to a spontaneous uprising against it
in early 1947. The way in which this uprising, known
as the “228 Incident,” has come to be acknowledged
in Taiwan during the democratizing era of the 1990s
is central to understanding the gulf that separates
native Taiwanese (benshengren) from the mainlander
compatriots (waisahengren). This latter population
migrated to the island after the civil war under the
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duress of defeat. The massacre of native Taiwanese that
took place on February 28, 1947, by the GMD and the
period thereafter have become central to the benshengren
opponents of GMD rule and a rallying cry for prodemocracy activists from the 1970s onwards. During
the 1990s, the political meaning of the 228 Incident was
transformed from one that had symbolized resistance
to internal repression from GMD rule, to a symbol for
resistance to external oppression by mainland China.
The principal definition of national identity thus lies
in the contrast between democracy on the island and
dictatorship on the mainland. As Edward Vickers says,
“The incident has come primarily to symbolize the
importance of protecting independence and democracy
for all of the island’s inhabitants—both native Taiwanese and the ‘new Taiwanese’ of waisahengren extraction—from the threat of another mainland takeover.”40
This sense of Taiwan as a society fundamentally distinct
from that of the PRC, and a determination to defend
this distinctiveness from a new mainland threat, is
the principal rationale for Taiwanese independence:
its achievement of democracy that the mainland has
failed to realize.
Yet, a peculiarity of Taiwan’s claim to independence
is that it wholly depends upon a foreign power to uphold
its status. While Taiwan’s achievement of democracy is
praiseworthy, “the underlying reality is that the island
remains a protectorate of U.S. imperial power.”41
The stalemate between Beijing and Taipei thus has
consequences not just for cross-Strait relations, but for
Sino-U.S. relations as well. U.S. support for Taiwan has
been a major obstacle standing in the way of friendly
Sino-American relations. In discerning long-term trends
in the region, optimistic U.S. officials have a much
harder time making the case for peaceful resolution of
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the Taiwan problem, particularly as China’s military
buildup opposite Taiwan continues to grow. Ever since
Taiwan’s first directly-elected president Lee Tenghui took office in 1996, the pace and scope of China’s
arms buildup have increased markedly, leading some
U.S. policy analysts and military planners to suspect
that China may resort to armed conflict to achieve
its goal of national unification.42 Lee became the first
leader of Taiwan to promote publicly Taiwan’s move
away from the reunification goal. Although Chinese
officials understand that military aggression against
Taiwan risks conflict with the United States, they have
repeatedly insisted that they will have no choice but to
take military action if Taiwan declares independence.
Beijing spelled out this threat with the passage of
the controversial Anti-Secession Law in March 2005,
which put on record in a binding legal code the threat
of military action should Taiwan’s leaders take steps
toward independence.43
Washington’s response to this threat has been to
continue its policy of strategic ambiguity which, on
the one hand, formally commits the United States to
the principle of “One China” as proclaimed in the
joint Shanghai communiqué of 1972, but on the other
hand informally binds the United States to protect the
island against any threat of invasion as stated in the
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. American policy thus
continues to balance U.S. assurances to China of its
support of a “One China policy” and of opposition to
Taiwan independence with its assurances to Taiwan of
continued support and protection.
This dual deterrence policy, however, is coming
under increasing pressure by pro-independence
moves by the current President Chen Shui Bian and
his administration. Although the George W. Bush
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administration has not taken extraordinary efforts
to resolve the Taiwan problem, Washington has
increasingly become, according to Perry Anderson,
“a hostage to Taiwanese democracy.” The surprise
presidential win by Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
candidate Chen Shui Bian in 2000 and his reelection in
2004 have reaffirmed this growing separatist trend in
Taiwan with worrying implications for Washington.
Concerned that Beijing is losing its patience with the
separatist movement in Taiwan that seeks to cultivate
a Taiwanese identity distinct from China, Washington
has shifted its policy emphasis toward reassuring
Beijing.44 However, it remains unclear how long the
United States can continue to balance its ties with Taipei
and Beijing, given the emergence of increasingly vocal
Taiwanese voters who appear to be prepared to confront China over their pro-independence aspirations.
These pro-independence inclinations, amounting
to more than a mere political movement, have also
manifested themselves in the classroom. Along with
the “new” recollections of the 228 Incident as the
starting point of Taiwanese resistance against the
GMD (and mainland China’s) oppression, the Ministry
of Education introduced in 2004 a new draft outline
for 2006 history courses that removed GMD founder
Sun Yat Sen and the Chinese Revolution of 1911 from
Taiwan’s domestic history. These events were moved
into the “foreign history” course on China.45
The decision to consider treating the 1911 Revolution officially as a “foreign” event received widespread
and scandalous coverage in China, which regarded it
as a clear symbol of just how far the DPP administration
has shifted Taiwan’s official political identity.46 Taiwanese politics no longer revolves around the opposition
between islanders and mainlanders, but between
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Taiwan and the CCP in Beijing. Increasingly organized
around identity politics with little distinction in social
and economic policy between the Green (DPP) and Blue
(GMD) camps, the popular embrace of nationalism
by Taiwan’s new politicians threatens to upset the
provisional nature of the status quo that has served
as the basis for stability in the region for more than 4
decades.
For Beijing leaders, such nationalist trends across
the Strait have signaled dangerous adventurism with
worrying implications for the Chinese state. What
concerns China’s leaders most is the fear of repeating
their own history. In the wake of the Opium War and
other encounters with the West, as well as the disastrous
defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, it was the
search for national renewal by nationalists like Sun Yat
Sen and other leaders of the ethnic Han majority that led
to the 1911 overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, which
they had stigmatized as “foreign.” What followed
was the fragmentation of the country into various
fiefdoms and decades of civil war. Beijing leaders
also have learned the lessons from the former Soviet
Union’s collapse and the breakup of Eastern Europe.
Fearful of repeating this history, and the history of the
Soviet empire, Beijing’s leaders have eagerly sought
to revive the shared memory of China’s victimization
by Japan, which entails both downplaying the period
of the Chinese civil war and overlooking instances of
conflict between Han Chinese and China’s minority
nationalisms.
Although the PRC acknowledges the existence of
multiple nationalities within its territory and concedes
to them autonomous jurisdictions, China nevertheless
remains a unitary, not a federal, state.47 Three large
areas—Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia—constitute
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separate linguistic and ethnic communities within the
Chinese state which are distinct from the ethnic Han
majority who make up 92 percent of the population.
Taiwan, like Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, is
a historical holdover from the time of the vast Qing
empire. However, it distinguishes itself from these
other areas by the fact that the vast majority of its
population is ethnically Han. About 85 percent are
descendents of migrants who arrived on the island
from Fujian and Guangdong Provinces between the
17th and late 19th centuries. Another 12 percent are
mainlander Chinese who came to the island at the end
of the civil war in 1949, while the remaining 2 percent
are native Taiwanese aborigines.
A declaration of de jure independence by Taiwan
would thus constitute a real threat to the territorial
integrity of China, since it could invite a dynamic of
national disintegration like the one that brought an
end to the Qing empire and the former Soviet Union.
After all, provinces like Tibet and Xinjiang, with their
own distinct ethnicity, language, and culture, have
much stronger claims to separate national identity than
Taiwan with its majority Han population. Moreover,
a declaration of independence would pose a serious
threat to the very existence of the CCP regime. This is
so because the Party’s legitimacy rests on its repeated
pledge to defend China’s integrity, pride, and national
interests. Taiwan’s successful secession from the
mainland would evoke the selfsame sense of shame
that many Chinese associate with the memory of the
island’s annexation by Japan and the beginning of
China’s century of humiliation. China’s anti-Japanese
nationalism demands the return of Taiwan, a former
colony of Japan, in order to redeem China from its
humiliating history of subordination to foreign powers.
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Chinese scholar Liu Ji put these views more starkly:
“Chinese history is a history of fighting disunity and
reinforcing unity. Any person or political group who
maintains Chinese unity and territorial integrity wins
the people’s support and the appreciation of historians.
Any persons or political group who tries to divide
China, to surrender the territory of our motherland to
others, and thus to harm the integrity of our motherland,
will be cast aside by the people and condemned from
generation to generation.”48
Taiwan’s creep toward independence as well as
the pressure by China’s new populist nationalism
for the regime in Beijing to prove itself by acting in
an assertive way against Japan (and other foreign
powers), has thus created a number of new challenges
for American Taiwan policy. For one thing, the policy
of strategic ambiguity that has served the United
States for over a quarter of a century was premised
on a goal of peaceful national reunification shared by
both China and Taiwan. During the rule of Chiang
Kai-shek and the GMD, there was no risk that Taiwan
would declare independence from China, nor did it
threaten to. The GMD’s reunification goal, while never
credible, had reinforced Taiwan’s political and cultural
identification with China. That goal was based on the
claim that Taiwan was the true political and cultural
representative of the Chinese state as forged by Sun
Yat Sen and the 1911 Revolution. Even after Nixon’s
1972 visit to Beijing, which eventually led Washington
to transfer its official recognition from Taiwan to China
under the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, both CCP and
GMD leaders nevertheless continued to acknowledge
the One-China principle.
Taiwan’s democratization and the rise of identity
politics in the 1990s, however, has undermined this
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traditional support for reunification in Taiwan. As
Malcolm Cook has observed, “Reunification is now a
minority political position of the opposition, with little
or no institutional base in the Taiwan state.”49 Whether
Taiwan’s search for an autonomous identity will ever
lead its leaders to formally declare independence
is unclear. What is clear, however, is that Taiwan’s
increasingly assertive nationalism threatens the status
quo. The last five U.S. presidential administrations have
worked to preserve this status quo through adherence
to a flexible approach that allowed Washington both
to have a One-China policy and to assist in the defense
of Taiwan. However, Taiwanese democratization and
the rise of nationalism in that country have threatened
the ability of the United States to maintain the status
quo, with frightening implications for both the United
States and the region.
After President Bush’s 2001 announcement that
the United States would do “whatever it takes” to
defend Taiwan, fears that such a mixed message “had
encouraged rash behavior in Taipei has since led
Washington to try to rein in DPP exuberance.”50 But it
is not at all clear how effective Washington’s efforts to
restrain Taipei will continue to be. As Andrew Peterson
has put it, “Whether the United States encourages it
or not, the movement for Taiwanese independence
is growing.”51 Although the United States continues
to advocate a peaceful resolution while deterring
aggression through strategic ambiguity, this policy
is increasingly viewed as problematic by those who
fear that domestic political forces in Taiwan have
undermined the basis of America’s long-standing
cross-Straits status quo. If Taipei finally decides to
plunge ahead, the United States would be forced to
pick sides in an escalating game of brinkmanship.
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What makes this scenario all the more frightening
is that the issues at stake are more symbolic than
substantive: they have more to do with patriotic
posturing than with achieving the actual conditions
of independence, since Taiwan is already a de facto
independent state, albeit one without international
recognition. Although Taiwan leaders believe that
their country is entitled to legitimate standing in the
international community, the fact remains, as Perry
Anderson has explained succinctly, “that the nation
claiming independence is itself completely dependent
on a foreign power to safeguard and insure it.”52 Trevor
Corson is even blunter: “Is the United States willing
to sacrifice American lives and regional stability just
so Taiwan could add a word in parentheses to its
name?”53 Furthermore, it is not clear whether Taiwan’s
declaration of de jure independence in fact would
change its international standing, since few countries
would actually risk their relationship with Beijing to
recognize Taiwan.
For the CCP, the issue of Taiwanese separation is
linked to issues of history, nationalism, and domestic
political considerations by the Party. It worries that
humiliation on this issue “could provide the rallying
point for people frustrated with the Party for other
reasons.”54 Few observers of the Taiwan problem
actually believe that China wants to occupy Taiwan
physically. China has everything to lose and very little
to gain from a conflict with Taiwan, or with the United
States for that matter. As Thomas Christensen notes,
“The conflict isn’t about territorial acquisition, it’s
about political identity.”55 What China wants is simply
to prevent Taiwan from securing legal independence
that would foreclose the possibility of eventual
reunification. This was the basis for the “one country,
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two systems approach” proposed in 1979 by Deng
Xiaoping stipulating that Taiwan could keep its own
administration and even its own military intact. Beijing
is also increasing China’s economic integration with
Taiwan in the hopes of deterring pro-independence
forces from pushing their cause too far.56 But the reality
is that increasing economic integration has not led to a
decrease of nationalist posturing in Taiwan. In much
the same way that pragmatic and populist nationalism
has often pulled Beijing in contradictory directions,
Taiwan’s increasing economic dependence on the
mainland has not deterred significantly the rising
nationalist forces on the island.
In light of recent trends in the region, which has
witnessed a surge of nationalism in China, South
Korea, and Japan, it appears doubtful that Taiwanese
nationalism will fade away any time soon, despite
the recent setbacks for the DPP. Maintaining the “one
China” framework in the face of these nationalist trends
will require Washington to take on more assertive and
intrusive actions to resist efforts by either Chinese or
Taiwanese nationalists to alter the status quo.57 Short
of withdrawing from its pledge to protect the island,
thereby forcing Taiwan alone to face the consequences
of upsetting the status quo—but also undermining U.S.
credibility, long-term security, and moral interests in the
political liberalization of the mainland in the process—
the United States should simply clarify that pledge.
Thomas Christensen, for example, has proposed that
the United States declare its commitment to defending
Taiwan’s freedom and democracy, not its sovereignty:
“The goal of such pro-democracy assurance strategy is
not to oppose the independence of Taiwan actively, but
to make a credible public commitment that the United
States has no interest in fighting for this outcome, were
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it to occur.”58 The immediate result would be a dramatic
reduction in China’s fears, but, more constructively, it
would link the prospect of China’s unification with
Taiwan to the achievement of certain democratic
conditions which, as Christensen notes, “can be a
powerful force for liberalization on the mainland.”59 By
linking unification with democracy, the United States
could continue to maintain its traditional commitment
to the “One-China policy” without risking political
entanglement in Taiwanese nationalism.
Yet, such a policy prescription is not without its
inherent contradictions. How can the United States
defend Taiwan’s freedom while at the same time deny
the Taiwanese people the right to exercise that freedom? Since the cause of Taiwanese nationalism rests
politically on the national right of self-determination, a
conditional promise to defend Taiwan’s democracy, but
not its sovereignty, would appear to be a contradiction
in terms.
However, the right to self-determination always
has been situational. As Perry Anderson put it, “Where
a nation-state was already constituted, rather than still
to be created, self-determination [by a part] has been
systematically rejected.”60 In such cases, this “right”
disappears, and “the standard means of preventing or
crushing secession is war.”61 Ideologically speaking,
then, what is at stake in Taiwan is not self-determination
per se, but secession. Today’s PRC largely resembles
the territorial holdover from the Qing empire which
contained distinct ethnic and linguistic communities
within the largely Han-dominated majority that make
up nearly 90 percent of the total population. To the
historical Han core of the country, the Manchus added
Manchuria, Tibet, and Mongolia, as well as Xinjiang and
an additional 600,000 square miles of new territories in
the far northwest.62
27

Although Beijing acknowledges the existence
of these communities as distinct nationalities and
accords them autonomous jurisdiction, their place
within “greater China” is legitimized by the fact that
they are historical holdovers of the Manchu empire.
From this standpoint, Taiwan, which is ethnically Han
and historically falls within the national core rather
than imperial periphery of this hybrid structure, is
part of China. Its independence from mainland China
therefore would be, in terms comparable with other
political entities that have sought separation from the
nation-state, a secession.
The historical precedents for defection from the
nation-state reveal that secessionist movements have
rarely been successful. “No standard nation-state has so
far ever allowed the detachment from its territory of a
breakaway community,” Perry Anderson noted.63 Nor
are democracies more tolerant of separatist leanings
than dictatorships, as the American Civil War, with its
600,000 dead, has aptly demonstrated. It is therefore
highly unlikely that the attitude of any future Chinese
democracy toward the secession of Taiwan would
differ significantly on this issue from China’s present
dictatorship.64
Although the United States has made clear its
opposition to any formal declaration of Taiwanese
independence, it continues to treat Taiwanese
nationalism as a legitimate expression of a vibrant
democracy and the culmination of a popular mandate in
need of U.S. protection and support. But Washington’s
commitment to Taiwan’s democracy cannot mean
respect for all the choices made by the Taiwanese people,
particularly since the cause of Taiwanese independence
completely depends upon the United States to secure
it. By treating Taiwanese nationalism as an expression
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of the right of self-determination rather than secession,
Washington has boxed itself into a dangerous corner
leaving it highly vulnerable to the machinations of
both Taiwanese and Chinese nationalism that could
force the United States to become involved in a costly
war it has no desire to fight. Washington is caught in
a bind, where two key values—self-determination and
unification—no longer mesh.
When the United States withdrew official recognition of Taiwan and agreed to acknowledge Beijing’s
One-China principle as proclaimed in the joint
Shanghai communiqué of 1972, Washington implicitly
agreed that Taiwan was part of China, and that peaceful
resolution of the conflict remained the ultimate goal
of U.S. policy. A clear but conditional commitment to
Taiwan’s democracy, but not to its sovereignty, merely
reaffirms Washington’s long-standing commitment to
abide by the terms set forth in this original agreement.
Such a commitment must entail an unambiguous
rejection of Taiwanese independence, and equally
unambiguous support of Taiwan’s freedom and
peaceful unification.
In this way, the United States can make a credible
public commitment to both the principle of unification
and democracy, thereby fulfilling its pledge to abide
by the “One-China” principle while also ensuring
that unification be achieved through peaceful and
democratic means. Taipei will not like this prodemocratic reasoning that undermines its basis for
achieving national autonomy, however symbolic. Yet,
the fact remains that the island claiming independence
remains a protectorate of U.S. power and as such, the
United States cannot allow Taiwanese nationalism to
dictate a politics of conflict that might involve America
in a war between Taiwan and China. As for Beijing,

29

precisely because it has both military and economic
reasons for avoiding war, assurances that the United
States will not support Taiwan’s permanent separation
from the mainland would go a long way in improving
relations between the United States and China.
While managing the competing nationalisms in
both Taiwan and China represents a major challenge
for U.S. policy on China and the key to maintaining
peace in East Asia, the highly unpredictable nature
of the North Korean regime and the rise of emotive
nationalism in South Korea are other potential sources
of instability for the region. Like the Taiwan Strait,
the Korean peninsula represents a highly combustible
zone of potential crisis that, if not managed properly,
can plunge the region into violent military conflict that
would have far-reaching implication for international
relations in Asia and beyond. At issue is North Korea’s
emergence as a new nuclear power, and South Korea’s
response to the ongoing crisis as it works to end the
seemingly interminable Korean War and promote the
reunification of the Korean peninsula. How Washington
responds to the rise of pan-Korean nationalism in South
Korea will have implications not only for the future of
the U.S.-South Korean alliance, but also for the peaceful
resolution of the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis.
Like the Taiwanese dilemma, the North Korean crisis
is manageable only if the United States recognizes
that the major sources of conflict in contemporary
East Asia, far from structurally driven, have arisen
from new historical controversies linked to emerging
nationalisms in the region. Resolving these conflicts
requires understanding the complex permutations
of these historical debates and their implications for
conflict and peace in Northeast Asia.
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Ending the Korean War: The North Korean
Nuclear Crisis in an Age of Unification.
Unification of the Korean peninsula is the
shared desire of all Koreans north and south of the
demilitarized zone (DMZ). Unlike Taiwan, which
has drifted away from its goal of unification with
democratization, a new generation of South Koreans
has worked hard to rejoin the bonds between the two
Koreas that were severed during the Cold War. These
efforts have resulted in new policy initiatives towards
North Korea, including economic cooperation and
cultural exchanges. With the ascendancy of the first
president from the opposition in 1998, Kim Dae Jung
fundamentally reoriented his country’s relationship to
its former Cold War enemy. Rejecting the premise of
previous South Korean presidents that only a hardline
approach would make North Korea more conciliatory,
Kim initiated his “sunshine policy,” which essentially
separated politics from economics, in order to permit
South Korean companies to do business with North
Korea without regard to political differences. The
impact of this approach, according to Kim, would be
felt gradually, as North Korea was penetrated and
assuaged by the liberalizing influence of an economy
already integrated with the global economy. In time,
it was hoped, North Korea would have liberalized
enough to make a more open relationship or even
unification with South Korea possible.65
The new engagement policy has continued to
inform Seoul’s relationship with Pyongyang under the
current Roh Mu-hyun administration.66 In sum, the
end of military rule in South Korea, the dynamics of
democratization, and the normalization of relations
between South Korea and its former Cold War enemies,
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China and the former Soviet Union, have induced the
South Korean government and the public to rethink
their brutal struggle with North Korea in light of the
changing global and domestic climate of a new postCold War era.
The politics of transition has also fueled a close
reexamination of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, which
accordingly is facing a profound transitional period.67
The emergence of the so-called “386 generation,”
which came to power in 2002 with the election of Roh
Mu-hyun, was the precipitating step in this transition.
Rejecting the previous political paradigm that had
prevailed under the Cold War regime, the new
generation of leaders in South Korea, capitalizing on
intimate ties to the United States, instead have begun
to seek realization of the long-held dream of Korean
reunification.
Linked to this new focus on inter-Korean
reconciliation in South Korean politics has been
a renewed interest in the country’s wartime past.
During the Cold War, the nationalist struggle against
communism and the North Korean threat had shaped
South Korea’s self-image as a developing state under
siege. In the era of reform, and particularly with the
collapse of European communism after 1989, South
Korean leaders have turned their attention outward to
the world stage, confident in their nation’s new status
as a global economic powerhouse. The result of these
developments is that South Koreans, freed from the
imperatives of the anti-communist line, have begun
to think very differently about their former Cold War
enemy. These new post-Cold War political revaluations
of North Korea are predicated (1) on recognition of the
enormous human cost in the event of a North Korean
collapse or resumption of the Korean War; and (2) on
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a developing perception of North Korea as a blighted
but basically benign enemy in need of prodding and
support. These views are shared by many younger
South Koreans, who came of age during South Korea’s
transition toward democracy in the late 1980s. Their
views have had enormous repercussions not only on
the way South Koreans now perceive their wartime
past, but their future as well.
Whereas North Korean brutality was central to
the official story of the Korean War until the 1990s,
the focus has now shifted to reexamining American
culpability and misdeeds during the conflict.68 In this
rewriting of the war, North Korea’s divisive role in the
Korean War is tacitly papered over, while America’s
alleged culpabilities have moved to the fore. The new
war memory that has emerged in the post-Cold War
context thus reflects a drastically changing relative
view of North Korea and the United States and the
latter’s role in the U.S.-South Korean security alliance
(from savior from communism to perpetrator of war
crimes). The active “remembering” of such alleged U.S.
atrocities as the massacre of civilians at No Gun Ri and
the concurrent erasure of North Korean culpability,
all in the name of the peaceful reunification of the
peninsula and ending the Cold War/Korean War,
reveals how war memory is linked directly to the
politics of reunification.
The need to revise Korea’s wartime history has
many causes, not the least of which was the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991, and with it the loss of North
Korea’s most powerful ally. After 1991, the communist
threat vanished and in its wake stood a shell of a
nation, abandoned by history, seeking some way to
survive. Suddenly North Korea no longer appeared
so threatening; with the military junta out of power,
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South Koreans found themselves able to say things
about their northern neighbor that they could not
say before. The result of such ferment was that South
Koreans, freed from the shackling imperatives of the
anti-communist line, began to think very differently
about their former Cold War enemy.69 President Roh
Mu-hyun’s “Policy of Peace and Prosperity” toward
North Korea, building on the approach of the earlier
Kim Dae Jung administration, interprets Pyongyang’s
pursuit of nuclear weapons primarily as a defensive
strategy, and advocates a policy of engagement with the
North to ease the tensions between the two countries.
South Korean efforts to build warmer relations with
North Korea thus must be broadly understood not only
to move beyond the Korean War and the old Cold War
framework that had sustained it, but also to return to a
prewar consensus based upon such elusive emotional
ties as ethnic identity, nationalism, and shared cultural
affinities. Such novel reformulations of pan-Korean
nationalism and identity have inevitably put South
Korea on a path of confrontation with the United States
over the best approach for resolving the North Korean
nuclear crisis. South Korea’s overriding concern is
how to resolve the issue of Korean reunification and to
peacefully integrate North Korea back into the world’s
most dynamic economic region, whether or not there
are nuclear weapons.70 The intensification of memory
and identity struggles in South Korea in recent years
is therefore part of a growing search for an alternative
view of the war years, including new interpretations of
U.S.-ROK relations. Attempts to rewrite North Korea
back into a shared and ongoing history of national
struggle and triumph over adversity—a familiar
theme in Korean history—reveal the growing desire
for normalization of relations between the two Koreas.
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This shift has also brought a fundamental reevaluation
in South Korea of U.S.-South Korean relations, as well
as the legacy of the unfinished war that the United
States is seen now as perpetuating.
This trend has also contributed to the rise of popular
anti-American sentiments, producing strains in the
U.S.-South Korean alliance that, in turn, have fueled
tensions between the Roh and Bush administrations
as they seek to find resolution to the ongoing North
Korean nuclear crisis.
Today, more South Koreans view the United States
as a greater threat to their national security than North
Korea. In a recent KBS poll, 43 percent of those surveyed
blamed the United States for North Korea’s nuclear test
as opposed to 37 percent who blamed North Korea,
and 13.9 percent who blamed the Roh administration.71
Meanwhile antipathy towards the United States has
continued to grow in South Korea, particularly among
the younger generation. A recent public opinion poll
sponsored by the Choson Ilbo revealed that 65.9 percent
of Koreans born in the 1980s (ages 16-25) said they
would side with North Korea in the event of a war
between North Korea and the United States.72
When North Korea went ahead with its nuclear test
on October 9, 2006, the Bush administration had hoped
that Pyongyang’s brazen act would finally create the
necessary momentum to precipitate a strategic shift
in South Korea’s relationship to North Korea and
help bridge the widening gap between the two allies.
Even North Korea’s longtime protector, China, issued
suitably harsh-worded statements so that many in
Washington believed that the solidarity of the outraged
world at last would press the North Koreans to giving
up their nuclear weapons.
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Yet, despite the initial optimism by the Bush
administration that a unified policy on North Korea
would be reached on the basis of a full implementation
of the final United Nations (UN) Security Council
Resolution 1718, both China and South Korea
have continued their economic cooperation with
the condemned nation. Despite Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice’s visit to Asia that was aimed to “rally
the support of our friends and allies in Northeast Asia
for a comprehensive strategy,”73 there was no world or
even regional outcry to impose full economic sanction
against the North.
Determined to pursue his country’s engagement
policy with the North, President Roh Mu-Hyun
widened the gap between Seoul and Washington
still further by refusing to go along with the U.S.
request at the November 2006 Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) meetings in Hanoi for Seoul to
join the Proliferation Strategic Initiative (PSI). Seoul
has also refused to discontinue the inter-Korean
reconciliation projects in Kaesong and Mt. Kumgang.
As one commentator of the summit meetings put it,
“What people may remember most about this APEC
meeting is that it became painfully obvious just how
successful Kim Jong Il—the charter member of the
“axis of evil”—has been at driving a wedge between
the United States and its ostensible ally in Seoul.”74
At its core, then, the marked difference in the
perception and treatment of the North Korean crisis
by the Bush and Roh administrations can be attributed
to two profoundly different views and interpretations
of the Cold War and the Korean War. Whereas the
Bush administration continues to view the Cold War
in light of the U.S. “victory” over communism and its
role in the Korean War as South Korea’s “savior” from
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a menacing and aggressive regime that continues to
threaten the peace and stability of the world, the Roh
administration has adamantly rejected this narrative,
in an effort to finally end the Cold War on the Korean
peninsula and bring about the peaceful reunification of
the two Koreas. Indeed, there is a shared elite and public
consensus that the Cold War ideological opposition
between communism and liberal democracy is now
being supplanted by differences emanating from
tradition, values, and social realities among nations.
The search for a post-division identity in contemporary
South Korea plays an important part in the shift
away from confrontation with North Korea toward
repairing the bonds of community that were torn by
the Cold War. It is this reasoning that has led the Roh
administration to vigorously oppose U.S. pressure to
participate in the PSI, claiming that it could lead South
Korea to unwanted armed conflict with Pyongyang.75
What all this means is that Washington must come
to terms with the emergence of pan-Korean nationalism
in South Korea in which ending the Korean War is the
main goal. In practical terms, this will require that the
United States engage North Korea in bilateral talks
aimed at finally settling the hostile relations between
the two countries with the ultimate goal of concluding
a peace treaty. Recent developments toward these
ends are promising. The setbacks in Iraq, the recent
congressional election defeats, and the 3-year deadlock
on the Six Party talks have finally pushed the Bush
administration to reverse its hardline stance and make
the concessions necessary to extract North Korean
concessions. The historical deal that was struck on
February 13, 2007, in Beijing will hopefully commence
the process of denuclearization of the peninsula.
Indeed, if anything good has come out of the continuing
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debacle in Iraq, it has been the stabilization of East
Asia. To the extent that the degeneration of the Middle
East has inclined the United States toward a more
conciliatory attitude toward North Korea, including
an accommodation with China over the boundaries
of influence in East Asia, the war in Iraq has had an
overall beneficial effect for the region. For the first time
since the end of the Cold War, there is a real prospect
of peace treaties (U.S-North Korea, Japan-North Korea)
and normalization on all sides.
The future of the Korean peninsula hinges on ending the Korean War by helping all Koreans realize the
goal of national reunification. Pressing Seoul to adopt
measures that conflict with these national interests
as a way of dealing with nuclear North Korea denies
this post-Cold War reality and the desires of a new
generation of South Koreans who seek reconciliation,
not confrontation, with North Korea. This denial, and
the pursuit of a policy that ignores these new postCold War/post-Korean War realities and desires, will
likely result in further strains in the relations between
the United States and South Korea and a deterioration
of Northeast Asia’s security environment.
Fortunately, the February 13, 2007, agreement
may offer a new path to reverse this trend. Still, there
is incompleteness to the agreement, and so how this
landmark deal will be implemented will require good
faith efforts from all parties involved. The United
States, in particular, must make every effort to start
normalization relations with North Korea, since it has
the most to lose if the deal falls through. Washington
cannot afford to repeat the history of the failed 1994
Agreed Framework. While no country in the region
has welcomed the emergence of a nuclear North
Korea, none of them has pursued regional stability
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by subordinating their own national concerns to the
global concerns of nonproliferation. China’s primary
interest is to maintain the status quo of national
regimes. Beijing fears a North Korean collapse as much
as it fears a unified Korea friendly to Washington.
China’s leaders are willing to live with the status quo
of a divided peninsula and a dependent North Korea.
While Seoul also does not welcome Pyongyang’s
nuclear capabilities, its main long-term goal is to
achieve national reconciliation, and it will continue
to support engagement with North Korea, with or
without Washington’s blessing.
Washington’s pursuit of a policy that attempts to
divide the two Koreas against one another will not
persuade Pyongyang to relinquish its nuclear and
missile forces. Rather, the likely result will be continued
inertia on the issue, as each power pursues its own
interests regardless of any others, thereby ensuring
preservation of the status quo, the continued fraying of
the U.S.-South Korean alliance, and continued North
Korean belligerence.
The test for both the United States and North Korea
comes in the months ahead: Will they be able to put
the accumulated half-century of hostility behind them
in order to move forward with the February 13, 2007,
agreements? An important barometer will be whether
the United States removes North Korea from a list of
terror-sponsoring countries and move forward with
bilateral talks with the North for the normalization
of diplomatic relations. For all the complaints that
American neoconservatives have made about the
deal—former United Nations Ambassador John Bolton
denounced it as a “very bad deal” that made the Bush
administration “look very weak”—Washington has
little choice but to follow through on the agreements
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if it wants a deal.76 The ironic outcome of the Bush
administration policy of pressuring and isolating
North Korea is that Washington, not Pyongyang, has
been isolated. Failure to craft a policy which reflects the
new regional dynamics of post-Cold War Asia has led
the Bush administration to pursue a policy resulting
in the continued inertia of the past 6 years on the
North Korean nuclear issue. This inertia has not been
without serious cost to the U.S.-South Korean alliance.
If Washington wants to improve its relationship with
Seoul, it must work to fundamentally change its
relationship with Pyongyang. Since Seoul and Beijing
will continue to pursue engagement with North Korea
(albeit for different reasons) and since Pyongyang has
continued to call for the normalization of relations with
Washington, the United States must work with, rather
than against, Seoul’s new nationalists to engage the
North Korean regime directly. The United States can no
longer afford to simply ignore the changes in the Korean
situation initiated by Kim Dae Jung. These efforts,
which were supported by the Clinton administration,
represented the first genuine attempt to achieve peace
and reconciliation between the two Koreas. Moreover,
they had the virtue of accommodating the national
interests of all parties concerned, especially those like
China and South Korea, who wield the most influence
over the North Korean regime.
The exercises in sanctions and isolation aimed to
change Pyongyang’s behavior have failed largely
because Washington has refused to take notice of the
new post-Cold War realities on the Korean peninsula.
The February 13, 2007, agreement is thus a welcome
development in that these new realities are at last
being addressed by an administration that has finally
come to terms with the limits of its power to change
the world, by dealing with the world as it is.
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Conclusion.
Both the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula
harbor very real dangers for the region. The combination
of fundamentally irreconcilable nationalist movements
in China and Taiwan, an unpredictable regime in North
Korea that has succeeded in driving a wedge between
Seoul and Washington, and lack of a unified strategy
for dealing with a nuclear North Korea have created
two highly combustible zones of potential conflict that
could plunge the region into war. A nuclear North
Korea may also prompt extensive new arms programs,
possibly including nuclear weapons programs by
Japan. It is hard to overstate the impact that Japan’s
remilitarization could have on U.S. interests in Asia,
and nowhere would this impact be greater than in
China.77 A remilitarized Japan allied with the United
States may well lead to an arms race in the region,
setting the stage for dangerous confrontations. In
supporting Japan’s remilitarization, the United States
ought to consider the short-term marginal benefits
in the light of likely long-term damage to East Asian
peace and stability.78
As products of the unfinished Cold War, a divided
China and a divided Korean peninsula have created
the potential for violent military clashes in the region.
The Cold War that ended in Europe did not end in
East Asia, and as a result the history disputes that fuel
tensions in the region continue to be sources of conflict
and instability. U.S. policymakers should begin to
focus their efforts on actively helping to resolve these
historical issues. In concrete terms, this means that
Washington should opt for strategic clarity with regard
to its security guarantees to Taiwan by offering to
defend Taiwanese democracy, but not its sovereignty.
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Washington should also work with Seoul, not against
it, to engage Pyongyang, the ultimate goal being to end
the Korean War. These steps will also require the United
States to pay close attention to the historical debates
that have fueled the region’s suspicion of Japan. Many
observers have noted that Beijing has strong suspicions
of U.S. efforts to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance,
particularly on Taiwan-related matters.79 In practical
terms, this means that the United States must look
beyond its immediate concerns with its war on terror
and reassess the destabilizing impact that Japanese
remilitarization could have on the region.
Although there is nothing inevitable about conflict
in East Asia, there is the possibility that a North Korean
or Taiwanese crisis could inadvertently spiral out of
control, particularly if Washington fails to manage the
competing nationalisms in the region. To that end, the
United States should work with its allies in the region
to overcome the unresolved legacies of East Asia’s
Cold War—rather than inadvertently inflaming them.
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